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Introduction 
 
Daniele De Santis 
 
 
Carneade! Chi era costui? –ruminava tra sé don Abbondio seduto sul suo 
seggiolone, in una stanza del piano superiore, con un libricciolo aperto sul 
davanti, quando Perpetua entrò a portargli l’ambasciata. “Carneade! questo 
nome mi par bene d’averlo letto o sentito; doveva essere un uomo di studio, un 
letteratone del tempo antico: è un nome di quelli; ma chi diavolo era costui?” 
A. MANZONI, I promessi sposi (cap. vii) 
 
Carneades! Who was he? –thought Don Abbondio to himself, as he sat in his  
arm-chair, in a room upstairs, with a small volume lying open before him, 
just as Perpetua entered to bring him the message. “Carneades! I seem  
to have heard or read this name; it must be some man of learning –some great  
scholar of antiquity; it is just like one of their names; but who the hell was he?” 
A. MANZONI, The Betrothed (chap. vii) 
 
No better analogy can be found to indirectly “illustrate” 
and thus describe the vicissitudes of the thought of Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze than what Don Abbondio exclaims about 
Carnades in Alessandro Manzoni’s 1827 masterpiece I 
promessi sposi. Carneades was in fact one of the most 
important and famous thinkers of the Hellenic period; as 
one of the great heads of the Platonic Academy after 
Arcesilaus, he was sent to Rome in 155 BC to lecture on 
justice (together with Diogenes of Babylon and Crito-
laus). Apparently, more than 400 books were written 
about him. And yet, the question that Don Abbondio asks 
himself (“Carnades! Who was he?”) reveals how little his 
name is known outside the quite restricted circles of pro-
fessional scholarship1.  
The same holds true of R. H. Lotze—this Carneades 
of our times! It is undeniable that Lotze, one of the “last 
German idealists” (F. Beiser) and a great representative of 
what has been called “another 19th century German his-
tory of philosophy (un altro Ottocento tedesco)”2, was 
one of the “sources” of all the most important and crucial 
philosophical traditions and lines of thought of the last 
century. Lotze seems to cast his long shadow on neo-
Kantianism (both early and late generations: Rickert and 
Windelband, Natorp, Cassirer, Bauch and Lask) as well as 
phenomenology (both in the husserlian and the heideg-
gerian varieties)—but he has also influenced, directly or 
indirectly, positively or only per viam negationis, an array 
of different philosophical movements and figures: prag-
matism and the so-called philosophy of values, G. Frege 
and B. Russell, (thereby penetrating the so-called analytic 
philosophy), H. Gomperz (with his Weltanschauungsle-
hre), the Lebensphilosophie, as well as the British idealis-
tic tradition. While Sandor Ferenczi maintains that, during 
his psychology lectures, Lotze anticipated some of 
Freud’s key insights3, and Benedetto Croce, in his Logica 
come scienza del concetto puro, still feels the urge to di-
rectly deal with, and hence dismiss, Lotze’s theory of ab-
straction4, Walter Benjamin starts off his second thesis 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte with a direct quotation 
from Lotze himself5. Yet, in spite of Lotze’s seemingly 
crucial importance—were his name to be uttered at most 
conferences and workshops on 19th and early 20th century 
philosophy (especially in the English speaking academic 
world, where the knowledge of the history of German 
philosophy after Hegel seems to still blindly follow K. 
Löwith’s account6), then the reaction would be exactly 
like Don Abbondio’s: “Lotze! Who was he? I seem to 
have heard or read this name; it must be some man of 
learning—some great scholar of modernity; it is just like 
one of their names; but who the hell was he?” 
It is of course undeniable that a great interest in 
Lotze’s philosophy has characterized —by and large—
early 20th century scholarship: the problem is that, even if 
such interest was not a “marginal” one, it was neverthe-
less confined to a series of circumscribed topics which 
almost exclusively revolved around “logical” questions 
and, in particular, the famous notion of “validity” (Gel-
tung). The interest in the phenomenological movement 
played, of course, a fundamental role in fostering this line 
of study and research, just like the debate between Mi-
chael Dummett and Hans Sluga about Lotze and his more 
or less alleged influence on Gottlob Frege (which, per-
haps for the first time and in quite a systematic way, con-
tributed to raising the question as to the historical roots of 
analytic philosophy within the framework of late 19th cen-
tury German philosophy). 
This being recognized, if it is too early to speak of a 
Lotze renaissance (we will soon try to explain what this 
would be like), its “signs” are nonetheless clear and abso-
lutely indisputable. These “signs” are, in the first place, of 
an editorial nature—the first one (just to recall an impor-
tant case) being the critical edition of Lotze’s correspon-
dence (Briefe und Dokumente, edited and published in 
2003 by R. Pester), to which one could add, to make a 
few scattered examples, the following publications: Il 
valore della validità by S. Besoli (1992); L’armonia im-
possible. Alle origini del concetto di valore in R. H. Lotze 
by B. Centi (1994); Hermann Lotze. Wege seines Denkens 
und Forschens by Pester himself (1997); and the more 
recent works: Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and 
Lotze (2014) and After Hegel by F. Beiser (2014); 
Hermann Lotze: An Intellectual Biography by W. Wood-
ward (2015); Lotze et son héritage, edited by F. Boccac-
cini (2015); Ein vergessener Forschungsstand. Friedrich 
Adolf Trendelenburg, Hermann Rudolf Lotze, Carl Stumpf 
und Kurt Lewin by T. Peters (2016); L’Allemagne et la 
querelle du matérialisme (1846-1866), edited by C. Morel 
(2017). It is also worth mentioning the recent Italian 
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translation of the 1874 Logik (edited by F. De Vincenzis 
in 2010) and the new German edition of the Mikrokosmos 
edited by N. Milkov (2017). 
It is clear, however, that if a blunt list of names and ti-
tles like the one just provided testifies to a renewed inter-
est in the philosophy of Lotze in its entirety (i.e., no 
longer confined to a limited set of problems and themes, 
which are almost exclusively studied only in order to bet-
ter understand other thinkers and other philosophies), it 
cannot rise above the “level” of what could be labeled, in 
the words of Kant, as quaestio facti. De facto, an increas-
ing number of scholars has been bringing the attention 
back to this “giant” of German or, better, European his-
tory of philosophy; the public event that has confirmed 
and borne witness to the existence of such a growing 
community is the Hermann Lotze Tagung organized and 
held in Bautzen (Lotze’s hometown) on May 20-21, 2017: 
Denken im Zwiespalt. Zum 200. Geburstag des Philoso-
phen Rudolf Hermann Lotze. But the answer to the quaes-
tio facti does not suffice, for it does not immediately as-
sess the quaestio juris—which can be framed as such: be-
yond the mere matter of fact of a certain number of schol-
ars working on Lotze and his contributions to the history 
of philosophy, science, metaphysics, psychology, episte-
mology as well as aesthetics, against the backdrop of 19th 
and 20th century history of philosophy, science, metaphys-
ics, psychology, epistemology and aesthetics—in what 
does Lotze’s own “philosophical” relevance consist for 
us, today, at the very beginning of the 21st century? As we 
firmly believe, it is only upon condition that this question 
is “successfully” addressed and answered that one can 
really speak of a “Lotze renaissance”. 
Although the present issue does not claim to directly 
answer the quaestio juris, it nevertheless wants to con-
tribute to the renewed interest in the philosophy of 
Lotze—and it does so by offering a series of essays ex-
ploring and touching upon the many aspects and sides of 
Lotze’s incredibly rich speculation, which in fact goes 
from “logic” to “metaphysics”, from “ethics” and “ethi-
cal” issues to his confrontation with the “empirical sci-
ences” and the “history of philosophy”. In her essay 
Lotze’s Conception of Metaphysics and Science: A Middle 
Position in the Materialism Controversy, Morel provides 
an incredibly insightful analysis of Lotze’s own position 
in the “materialism controversy”, which inflamed the in-
tellect of a great deal of scientists, philosophers and intel-
lectuals of Germany, such as R. Wagner, C. Vogt, L. 
Büchner, J. Frauenstädt on behalf of Schopenhauer, and 
Nietzsche (to recall just a few major and more popular 
names): this essay’s main merit and value consist in a 
clear exposition of the relation between philosophy, nota-
bly “metaphysics”, and science in Lotze regarding the 
quite thorny question on the relations between “matter” 
and “spirit”. Manca’s essay (L’espressione del pensiero. 
Lotze e il tentativo di superamento di Hegel) is dedicated 
to what could be called a comparative examination of 
some basic tenets of Lotze’s conception of logic and the-
ory of knowledge from the 1874 Logik with Hegel’s 
views: based on the strong conviction that Lotze’s phi-
losophy, notably his understanding of the relationship be-
tween Denken and Sein—which Manca holds to represent 
the exact opposite of the Hegelian version—is to be con-
sidered as a sort of filter that partially determined and in-
fluenced 20th century’s reception of the thinker from 
Stuttgart. N. Milkov’s essay, the title of which is 
Hermann Lotze and Franz Brentano, has the merit of rais-
ing the crucial question as to the relation between the phi-
losopher of Bautzen and the master of Husserl, Freud and 
Stumpf (to recall just a few names)—his goal being to 
bring to the light and emphasize not only the actual rela-
tions between the two, but a series of problems and con-
cepts through which Lotze influenced Brentano himself: 
the judgment and its content, the content of perception, 
and the very issue of intentionality. As Milkov asserts at 
the outset: “Franz Brentano was not a solitary figure who 
propounded his philosophy in lonely isolation from other 
contemporary philosophers in Germany, as some neo-
Brentanists have claimed over the last thirty to forty 
years. The aim in what follows is to correct such miscon-
ceptions by establishing that Brentano developed his phi-
losophical psychology while actively engaged in the rich 
intellectual-historical and academic context of his time—
in particular, under the influence of Hermann Lotze”. In 
“A Halting-Stage in the Evolution of Logical Theory”: 
John Dewey’s Critical Engagement with Lotze’s Logic, 
Christensen runs along a similar line, trying to follow and 
briefly reconstruct Lotze’s negative influence on Dewey’s 
Studies in Logical Theory, where the new “instrumental” 
logic is presented and worked out in a straightforward op-
position to the great 1874 Logic of the thinker from 
Bautzen. If Milkov’s effort represents a first, important 
step toward undermining the myth of the so-called “Aus-
trian philosophy” (understood as something isolated and 
unique with respect to the contemporary German speak-
ing philosophy), Christensen’s essay is of crucial impor-
tance for whoever is interested in following the “migra-
tion”, so to speak, of 19th century German philosophy to 
the new world. Vagnetti’s and Pellizzer’s contributions 
revolve around the same topic, yet looked at it from two 
very different angles: the quite famous and also very 
thorny problem of “validity”. Now, whereas M. Vagnetti 
(The “Logik” by Rudolf Hermann Lotze: The Concept of 
Geltung) provides us with a quite detailed account of both 
the meaning and role that such a concept plays in Lotze’s 
logic and “theory of knowledge”, F. Pellizzer (Il fascino 
dell’ideale: Heidegger e il lotzismo di Husserl) focuses 
on M. Heidegger’s critical reading of Lotze and—via the 
latter—of Husserl’s early Platonic “idealism”. These es-
says almost represent the two sides of the same coin: the 
meticulously logical and gnoseological analysis offered 
by Vagnetti is in fact followed by the specifically onto-
logical approach of Heidegger. Iocco’s paper, whose title 
is Lotze e Scheler: emotivismo e autocoscienza, takes us 
into a completely different topic: it develops an analysis 
of Lotze’s theory of emotions, and elaborates upon his 
influence on the phenomenology of “emotional life” of 
Max Scheler. Iocco’s aim consists in showing how their 
emotional account of self-consciousness represents a form 
of moderate emotivism—the latter being the thesis ac-
cording to which moral judgments can have a “gnose-
ological” function only to the extent that we also take into 
consideration the affective and emotional state that actu-
ally motivates them7. Riccardo Martinelli closes the vol-
ume with his essay on Platonismo o psicologismo? La 
filosofia della logica di Lotze, where he compares Lotze’s 
two logic volumes (the 1843 edition and the 1874 große 
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Logik) on two specific and interrelated topics: Lotze’s re-
buttal of any “psychologistic” and “ontological” approach 
to logic, which he identifies with Herbart and Hegel re-
spectively; the process of concept-formation (especially 
for what regards the great logic). After reconstructing the 
process that leads from a series of mere associations to 
the actual framing of a concept through the singling out of 
its “foundation” (which only can guarantee the mutual 
inherence or “co-belongingness” of its parts), Martinelli 
moves on to raise and tackle the thorny question as to 
whether Lotze can be considered as a “psychologist” or a 
“Platonist” in logic. His answer is straightforward: Lotze 
is neither. If the “teleological” function that Lotze as-
cribes to concepts in the process of knowledge forbids or 
should forbid the interpretation of the latter based on any 
rigid psychological mechanism, what Martinelli calls the 
a posteriori coincidence of thinking and being (i.e., the 
claim that das Denken has to somehow overcome itself so 
as to reach das Sein through the multiplicity of its opera-
tions, classifications, constructions) discloses the fact that 
for Lotze concepts in general are super-subjective, yet not 
at all in an ontological way. 
We would like to conclude this short introduction by 
expressing our gratitude to the director of this journal, 
Prof. Marco Sgarbi, for hosting this issue on Lotze; and to 
William Woodward—who, due to copyright problems, 
could not contribute with his paper on Lotze and the Ge-
stalt psychology as originally planned, but who enthusias-
tically supported the initiative from the very beginning.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 M. Bonazzi, Il platonismo (Milan: Einaudi, 2015). 
2 R. Pettoello, “Un altro Ottocento tedesco”, Rivista di Storia della 
Filosofia, 1990, 81-111. See also J. Benoist (Ed.), Un autre XIXe siècle 
allemand, special issue of Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 2000 
(3). 
3 S. Ferenczi, “Aus der ‘Psychologie’ von Hermann Lotze”, Imago. 
Zeitschrift für Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die 
Geisteswissenschaften, 1913, 238-241, in particular page 238. 
4 B. Croce, Logica come scienza del concetto puro (Bari: Laterza, 1947), 
354-355. 
5 “‘Zu den bemerkenswerthesten Eigenthümlichkeiten des menschlichen 
Gemüths’, sagt Lotze, ‘gehört ... neben so vieler Selbstsucht im Einzel-
nen die allgemeine Neidlosigkeit jeder Gegenwart gegen ihre Zukunft’”. 
6 According to the index nominorum, there is no mention of Lotze in K. 
Löwith’s Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken 
des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1941). 
7 I want to personally thank all the contributors for their patience, and 
Charlotte Morel and Nikolay Milkov in particular for their very useful 
remarks and comments on this short introduction. 
